We consider locally incentive compatible mechanisms with deterministic allocation rules and transfers with quasilinear utility. Our focus in on ordinal type spaces, which are generated by considering a set of ordinal preferences over alternatives and then considering all non-negative type vectors representing such preferences. We identify a rich class of ordinal type spaces, which includes the single peaked type space, where local incentive compatibility does not imply incentive compatibility. Our main result shows that in such type spaces, a mechanism is locally incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible if and only if it is incentive compatible. Payment-only incentive compatibility requires that a mechanism that generates the same allocation at two types must have the same payment at those two types.
Introduction
The fundamental axiom in mechanism design is that an agent should have no incentive to report any type in the type space other than his true type. However, in many settings, verifying all possible incentive constraints of a mechanism may be too demanding. Further, a reasonable behavioral assumption is that an agent of a particular type only misreports types in a neighborhood of his true type which is strictly smaller than the entire type space. This paper is concerned with weakening incentive compatibility to local incentive compatibility in mechanism design problems with deterministic allocation rules and transfers with quasilinear utility.
In an important contribution, Carroll (2012) shows that in convex type spaces every locally incentive compatible mechanism is incentive compatible -his result also works with randomized allocation rules. While convexity may be a reasonable assumption that is satisfied by many type spaces, there are important type spaces that are non-convex. For instance, if types are such that the underlying ordinal preferences over alternatives satisfy single-peaked property, we get a non-convex type space. We show that the result in Carroll (2012) is no longer true in such non-convex type spaces.
However, we show that this break down is only due to violation of a particular type of incentive constraint. We introduce the notion of payment-only incentive compatibility for this. Suppose s and t are two types where the allocation decision of a mechanism is the same. Payment-only incentive compatibility requires that an agent of type s should have no incentive to report t to this mechanism. Since type s and t have identical allocation decisions, payment-only incentive compatibility can be equivalently stated as requiring that the payment decisions at s and t should also be the same.
We identify a large class of non-convex type spaces where local incentive compatibility along with payment-only incentive compatibility is equivalent to incentive compatibility. 1 We call such type spaces top connected ordinal type spaces. Ordinal type spaces are defined by taking a set of permissible strict linear orders over alternatives and considering the closure of all non-negative type vectors that represent these orders. Thus, restriction on the underlying set of strict linear orders translates to restrictions on type spaces. Top connectedness is a technical property on the permissible set of strict linear orders.
Two familiar ordinal domain restrictions satisfy our top connectedness property: (a) set of all single peaked strict linear orders and (b) a particular set of single crossing domain. In other words, in the type space constructed by taking the closure of all types representing the strict linear orders in these domains, local incentive compatibility and payment-only incentive compatibility will imply incentive compatibility.
While single peakedness and single crossing property are well motivated restrictions on preferences in ordinal environment, they are equally important restrictions in our cardinal environment. For instance, single peaked type restriction may make sense in certain scheduling problems and location problems. Note that we are imposing these restrictions on the underlying preferences over alternatives -preferences over transfers is still determined using quasilinear utility functions.
We give various examples to show that our result does not extend to other non-convex type spaces easily. One type space that we discuss is the dichotomous type space, where type of the agent is described by a subset of alternatives, called the acceptable alternatives, and a value (non-negative number) for the acceptable alternatives. Value for alternatives not in the acceptable set is zero, whereas all the alternatives in the acceptable set give the same value. Both the value and the acceptable set are private information. Dichotomous type space consists of all such types. It a is non-convex but connected type space.
We show that in the restricted dichotomous type space where the subset of acceptable alternatives always consists of exactly one alternative, then local incentive compatibility and payment-only incentive compatibility (along with a mild range condition) implies incentive compatibility. However, in the general dichotomous type space, we construct a locally incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible mechanisms (satisfying reasonable range conditions) that is not incentive compatible. This illustrates that the equivalence of incentive compatibility with local incentive compatibility and payment-only incentive compatibility is delicate.
We also investigate the issue of local implementation. An allocation rule is implementable if there exists a payment function such that the resulting mechanism is incentive compatible. A well known result in Rockafellar (1970) and Rochet (1987) shows that implementability is equivalent to a condition called cycle monotonicity. With deterministic allocation rules and convex type spaces, a weaker cycle monotonicity condition, called 2-cycle monotonicity, is known to be necessary and sufficient for implementability (Saks and Yu, 2005; Ashlagi et al., 2010) . An allocation rule is locally implementable if for every type in the type space, it is 2-cycle monotone in an arbitrary neighborhood around that type. In a result parallel to Carroll (2012) , Archer and Kleinberg (2008) show that local implementability implies implementability in convex type spaces -see also Archer and Kleinberg (2014) . 2 We show that in any polygonally connected type space, if local implementability implies implementability, then local incentive compatibility implies incentive compatibility. In that sense, local implementability implying implementability is a stronger conclusion to make than local incentive compatibility implying incentive compatibility in any polygonally connected type space. We use this result to show that in the single peaked type space, a local implementable allocation rule may not be implementable. We also identify a "punctured" convex type space -a type space constructed by removing a finite set from an open convex set -where local implementability implies implementability, and hence, local incentive compatibility implies incentive compatibility.
Relation to Literature. In the auction design literature with transfers and quasilinear utility, a long standing research agenda has been to identify a minimal set of incentive constraints that will imply overall incentive compatibility -see discussions on relaxed problem in Chapter 7 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) , Armstrong (2000) , and Chapter 6 in Vohra (2011) . While most of this literature was not very explicit about the local versus global incentive compatibility problem, Carroll (2012) was the first to provide a general definition and a result in a broad set of mechanism design settings. The analogous results for local implementability were shown in Archer and Kleinberg (2008) -see also Archer and Kleinberg (2014) . Berger et al. (2010) show that the results in Archer and Kleinberg (2008) can be extended to certain connected type spaces under strong additional technical conditions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the notion of local incentive compatibility formally in Section 2 followed by a motivating example in Section 2.1. Section 3 introduces the notion of payment-only incentive compatibility and states the main result with a detailed description of type spaces where the main result works and give some examples of some type spaces where it fails. Section 4 discusses the notion of local implementation. We conclude in Section 5. All the omitted proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Local Incentive Compatibility
There is a single agent and a finite set of alternatives A. The type of the agent is a vector in R |A| . The type space (possible set of types) of the agent is a set T ⊆ R |A| . If the agent has type t ∈ T , then his valuation for any alternative a ∈ A is denoted by t(a).
An allocation rule is a map f : T → A. Note that we only consider deterministic allocation rule. A payment rule is a map p : T → R. A mechanism M consists of an allocation rule f and a payment rule p. If the agent has type t but reports s to the mechanism, then his net utility is given by
where we assumed quasilinearity to evaluate utility from payments.
We will say that an agent of type t cannot manipulate to a type s if
To define local incentive compatibility, we define the notion of a neighborhood. For every ǫ > 0 and every t ∈ T , let B ǫ (t) := {s ∈ T : ||s − t|| < ǫ} be the open |A|-dimensional ball around t contained in T .
Definition 2 A mechanism M ≡ (f, p) is locally incentive compatible if for every t ∈ T there exists an ǫ > 0 such that for all s ∈ B ǫ (t), t cannot manipulate to s and s cannot manipulate to t.
Notice that this is not equivalent to requiring that for every t ∈ T there exists an ǫ > 0 such that M restricted to B ǫ (t) is incentive compatible. We will come back to this strengthening of local incentive compatibility later.
This notion of local incentive compatibility was introduced in Carroll (2012) . He showed that if a type space is convex, then local incentive compatibility implies incentive compatibility. We start off by giving an example of an important non-convex type space, where local incentive compatibility is no longer equivalent to incentive compatibility.
A Motivating Example
Consider the following type space. Let ≻ be a strict linear order over the set of alternatives. A strict preference ordering P is single peaked with respect to ≻ if for every a, b ∈ A with b ≻ a ≻ P (1) or P (1) ≻ a ≻ b, where P (1) is the highest ranked alternative in P , we have aP b. A strict type t ∈ R |A| represents an ordering P if for all a, b ∈ A, t(a) > t(b) if and only if aP b. Let D s denote the set of all single peaked preference orderings and T s be the closure of all non-negative types representing types in D s .
The single peaked type space T s is a natural type space in many problems. For instance, consider a scheduling problem, where a supplier is deciding on delivery of products to various firms on days of the week. Each firm will have a best day of the week and as the delivery day goes away from the best day, the value of the firm for the products is likely decrease.
We show that in the single peaked type space, local incentive compatibility does not imply incentive compatibility. 3
Example 1
Let A = {a, b, c} and D s be the following domain.
Note that D s is single peaked with respect to a ≻ b ≻ c. We consider the following mechanism on T s . We partition T s as Table 1 along with the values of f and p in them. We claim the following.
Claim 1 The mechanism (f, p) in Table 1 is locally incentive compatible but not incentive compatible.
The proof of Claim 1 is in the Appendix.
The Main Result
We state and prove our main result in this section. We begin by pointing out the precise reason why local incentive compatibility did not imply incentive compatibility in Example compatible mechanism is incentive compatible. This necessary condition is violated by the single peaked type space. Since we restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms, this necessary condition cannot be applied in our setting. Example 1 directly shows that local incentive compatibility does not imply incentive compatibility in single peaked type space.
1. A critical feature of Example 1 is that for every type t ∈ T 1 ∪ T 7 , we have f (t) = a, but p(t) = 2 if t ∈ T 1 and p(t) = 0 if t ∈ T 7 . This leads to manipulation. We impose below a notion of incentive compatibility that gets rid of such manipulations.
It is easy to verify that payment-only incentive compatibility is equivalent to the following condition on payments.
Observation 1 A mechanism (f, p) is payment-only incentive compatible if and only if for every pair of types s, t with f (s) = f (t), we have p(s) = p(t).
Notice that an incentive compatible mechanism is payment-only incentive compatible. Obviously, payment-only incentive compatibility is not a local condition as it takes care of some non-local incentive constraints also. However, its implications from a design perspective is mild -it requires the domain of the payment function to be the set of alternatives instead of the type space. In other words, local incentive compatibility along with payment-only incentive compatibility still requires us to verify only local incentive constraints once the domain of the payment function is changed. Thus, the nature of the verification problem for the designer remains the same, though the verification of the mechanism is now easier.
Top Connected Domains
We now identify a class of type spaces where local incentive compatibility along with paymentonly incentive compatibility implies incentive compatibility. We give two important nonconvex type spaces that are covered by our general result.
To introduce our type spaces, we state below some definitions. Let P the set of all strict orderings over A. A domain is any subset D ⊆ P. A type t ∈ R |A| is strict if t(a) = t(b) for all a, b ∈ A. Every strict type induces an ordering in P. We say a strict type t represents an ordering P ∈ P if for every a, b ∈ A, t(a) > t(b) if and only if aP b. For any ordinal domain D ⊆ P, let V (D) be the set of all strict types in R |A| + representing orderings in D -note that we required our strict type to be non-negative. A type space T is ordinal type space if there exists a domain D such that T = cl(V (D)), where cl(V (D)) is the closure of the set V (D).
Given an ordering P and an alternative a, we denote by r(P, a) the rank of a in P . A sequence of orderings (P 1 , . . . , P k ) is a-improving for an alternative a if for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, r(P j , a) ≥ r(P j+1 , a).
We say two orderings P and P ′ are adjacent if there exists a, b ∈ A such that r(P, a) = r(P, b) + 1, r(P ′ , a) = r(P, b), r(P ′ , b) = r(P, a), and for all c ∈ A \ {a, b}, r(P, c) = r(P ′ , c).
A sequence of orderings (P 1 , . . . , P k ) is connected if for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, P j and P j+1 are adjacent.
Definition 4 A domain D is top connected if for every a ∈ A, there exists a P ∈ D such that • Richness. r(P, a) = 1 and • Monotone Connectedness. for every P ′ ∈ D, there exists an a-improving connected sequence (P ′ ≡ P 1 , . . . , P k ≡ P ).
We give an example to illustrate top-connectedness. Let A = {a, b, c, d} and consider the set of preference orderings shown in Table 2 . Notice that for every x ∈ A, there is a preference ordering P in Table 2 , where r(P, x) = 1. Further, for any P ′ = P , we can construct a sequence of connected orderings such that the position of x is improving in the sequence. As an example, consider c ∈ A and note that r(P 5 , c) = 1. Now, consider P 8 and note that r(P 8 , c) = 2. But consider the sequence (P 8 , P 7 , P 5 ) and notice that r(P 8 , c) > r(P 7 , c) = r(P 5 , c). Further P 8 and P 7 are adjacent and P 7 and P 5 are adjacent. We discuss some specific domains that are top connected later. We require the following range condition for our main result.
Definition 5 An allocation rule f : T → A satisfies strict type range (STR) condition if for every a ∈ A, there is a strict type t ∈ T such that f (t) = a.
Note that STR is stronger than ontoness since we require the alternative to be chosen at some strict type. Before we state our main result, we state a notion of local incentive compatibility that is commonly used in ordinal voting models without transfers (Carroll, 2012; Sato, 2013a,b) , but it is relevant for our ordinal type spaces also.
Definition 6 A mechanism (f, p) defined on an ordinal type space cl(V (D)) is adjacent incentive compatible if for every P, P ′ ∈ D such that P and P ′ are adjacent, and for every s, t ∈ cl(V ({P, P ′ })), t cannot manipulate to s.
We now state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1 Suppose D is a top connected domain and T = cl(V (D)). Let f : T → A be a deterministic allocation rule satisfying STR and (f, p) be a mechanism defined on type space T . Then, the following statements are equivalent.
1. (f, p) is locally incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible.
2. (f, p) is adjacent incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible.
(f, p) is incentive compatible.
Proof : Obviously, 3 ⇒ 1. We only show 1 ⇒ 2 and 2 ⇒ 3. For 1 ⇒ 2, consider the following elementary fact.
Proof : Since P and P ′ are adjacent, there exists a, b ∈ A such that r(P, a) = r(P, b) + 1, r(P ′ , a) = r(P, b), r(P ′ , b) = r(P, a), and for all c ∈ A \ {a, b}, r(P, c) = r(P ′ , c). Now, choose s, t ∈ cl(V ({P, P ′ })). By definition, s and t only differ in their ranking of a and b, which are consecutively ranked in P and P ′ . As a result, any convex combination of s and t will lie in cl(V ({P, P ′ })).
Now, let (f, p) be a locally incentive compatible mechanism in T = cl(V (D)), where D is top connected. Now, choose any P, P ′ ∈ D such that P, P ′ are adjacent. By Carroll (2012) , we know that local incentive compatibility in a convex type space implies incentive compatibility. Hence, (f, p) restricted to cl(V ({P, P ′ })) is incentive compatible by Fact 1. As a result, (f, p) is adjacent incentive compatible.
We now show 2 ⇒ 3. Let (f, p) be an adjacent incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible mechanism. Since (f, p) is payment-only incentive compatible, we have
. Hence, with a slight abuse of notation, we write p as a map p : A → R. Consider any type s ∈ T and let f (s) = a. Choose any b ∈ A. We need to show that
We do the proof in two steps.
Step 1. In this step, we show that there exists an orderingP ∈ D such that r(P , b) = 1 and a typet representingP such that f (t) = b. By STR, there is a strict type t ∈ T such that f (t) = b. LetP ∈ D be an ordering such that t ∈ V ({P }). By top-connectedness, there exists an orderingP such that r(P , b) = 1 and a b-improving connected sequence (P ≡ P 1 , . . . , P k ≡P ).
Since P 1 and P 2 are adjacent, there is some pair of alternatives x, y ∈ A such that r(P 1 , y) = r(P 1 , x) + 1, r(P 2 , x) = r(P 1 , y), r(P 2 , y) = r(P 1 , x), and r(P 2 , z) = r(P 1 , z) for all z ∈ A \ {x, y}. Note that since the sequence is b-improving, x = b. Let t 1 ≡ t and construct t 2 as follows by choosing ǫ > 0 but sufficiently close to zero:
Observe that t 2 represents P 2 -t 2 is constructed by lowering t 1 (x) to t 1 (y) − ǫ, increasing t 1 (b) by ǫ and keeping all values unchanged from t 1 . Further, t 2 can be constructed since t 1 is a strict type.
Since P 1 and P 2 are adjacent, by adjacent incentive compatibility,
Adding these incentive constraints, we get
By definition of t 2 , the above inequality can only be satisfied if f (t 2 ) = b. Hence, f (t 2 ) = b. Now, we repeat this procedure inductively. For some j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, suppose we have found a type t j representing the ordering P j such that f (t j ) = b. Since P j and P j+1 are adjacent, there is some pair of alternatives x, y ∈ A such that r(P j , y) = r(P j , x) + 1, r(P j+1 , x) = r(P j , y), r(P j+1 , y) = r(P j , x), and r(P j+1 , z) = r(P j , z) for all z ∈ A \ {x, y}. Note that since the sequence is b-improving, x = b. We construct t j+1 as follows by choosing ǫ > 0 but sufficiently close to zero:
Step 2. We complete the proof in this step. Let P be an ordering such that s ∈ cl(V ({P })). Let s 1 be a strict type representing P such that s 1 is arbitrarily close to s. Let f (s 1 ) = a 1 . Since s 1 is arbitrarily close to s and represents the same ordering as s, adjacent incentive compatibility implies that s(a) − s(a 1 ) ≥ p(a) − p(a 1 ).
(1)
By top connectedness, there is a b-improving connected sequence (P ≡ P 1 , . . . , P k ≡P ). Now, we construct a sequence of types (s 1 , . . . , s k ) such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, s j represents P j .
Since P 1 and P 2 are adjacent, there is some pair of alternatives x, y ∈ A such that r(P 1 , y) = r(P 1 , x) + 1, r(P 2 , x) = r(P 1 , y), r(P 2 , y) = r(P 1 , x), and r(P 2 , z) = r(P 1 , z) for all z ∈ A \ {x, y}. Note that since the sequence is b-improving, x = b. Now, construct s 2 as follows by choosing ǫ > 0 but sufficiently close to zero:
Observe that s 2 represents P 2 and s 1 (z) ≥ s 2 (z) for all z ∈ A with strict inequality holding for z = x and equality holding for z = x. Since s 1 is a strict type, we can construct s 2 by lowering s 1 (x) to a value just below s 1 (y) and keeping all other values of alternatives the same. Denote f (s 2 ) ≡ a 2 . Since P 1 and P 2 are adjacent, adjacent incentive compatibility gives,
We now construct the sequence inductively using the above procedure -having defined s j , we define s j+1 by exactly the same procedure as we did for constructing s 2 from s 1 . Let f (s j ) ≡ a j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}. As before incentive compatibility implies for every
Adding over all j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and telescoping the right hand side, we get
By construction, s j (a j+1 ) ≥ s j+1 (a j+1 ) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}. Hence, the above inequality implies
( 2) Now, both s k andt representP . Hence, adjacent incentive compatibility gives,
where we used the fact that f (t) = b. Adding Inequalities 2 and 3, and using the fact that
As a result, we have s 1 (b) = s k (b) and using Inequality 4, we get
Adding Inequalities 5 and 1, we get
This can be rewritten as
Since s 1 is arbitrarily close s, Inequality 6 reduces to
which is the required incentive compatibility condition.
In the statement of Theorem 1, if D is a top connected domain, our type space is closure of the set of all non-negative types representing D. As can be seen from the proof of Theorem 1, we do not necessarily need all the types representing D. The proof still works if we assume that there is an upper bound β on the maximum value on any alternative. Then, T can be defined as
Similarly, the proof can be modified slightly to work if we have a lower bound and an upper bound on the values of the alternatives.
Top connectedness is a general condition satisfied by many domains. We explicitly describe two such interesting domains in the next section. We now present two examples to show that the STR condition and the richness part of the top connected condition are required for Theorem 1 to hold.
The first example gives a domain that is connected (in the sense that we can reach any preference ordering from every preference ordering by a connected sequence of orderings) but violates richness part of the top connected condition. This shows that the richness requirement of the top connected definition is necessary for Theorem 1 to hold. 4
Example 2
Let A = {a, b, c} and D be the following domain.
We consider the following mechanism on cl(V (D)).
We show the following.
Claim 2 The mechanism (f, p) is locally incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible but not incentive compatible.
The proof of Claim 2 is in the Appendix.
Next, we show that the STR condition in Theorem 1 is required. The following example gives a mechanism in the single peaked type space that violates STR and incentive compatibility, but satisfies local incentive compatibility and payment-only incentive compatibility.
Example 3
We claim the following.
Claim 3 Let (f, p) be the above mechanism.
1. (f, p) is locally incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible but not incentive compatible.
2. The allocation rule f does not satisfy STR.
The proof of Claim 3 is in the Appendix.
Domains Satisfying Top Connectedness
We show two important domains where Theorem 1 holds: (a) the domain consisting of all single peaked preferences (b) a single crossing domain. To show this, we provide a sufficient condition for a domain to be top connected. We then show that this sufficient condition holds in these domains.
To introduce our sufficient condition, we begin with some definitions. These definitions have been borrowed from the local incentive compatibility literature in voting environment (Sato, 2013b) . Since we study ordinal type spaces, they turn out to be relevant for us also. For any preference ordering P and any alternative a ∈ A, let r(P, a) denote the rank of a in P . We say P ′ is a (a, b)-swap of P if r(P, x) = r(P ′ , x) for all x / ∈ {a, b}, r(P, a) = r(P, b) − 1, r(P ′ , a) = r(P ′ , b) + 1. In other words, if a and b are consecutively ranked in P with a ranked above b, the preference ordering obtained by just swapping the positions of a and b is called an (a, b)-swap of P . Note that if P ′ is an (a, b)-swap of P for some a, b ∈ A, then P and P ′ are adjacent.
Definition 7 A distinct sequence of orderings (P 1 , . . . , P k ) is without restoration if for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, P j and P j+1 are adjacent and there exists no distinct j, j ′ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} and x, y ∈ A such that P j+1 is a (x, y)-swap of P j and P j ′ +1 is a (y, x)-swap of P j ′ .
A domain D is connected without restoration if for every P, P ′ ∈ D, there exists a sequence of distinct orderings (P = P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P k , P k+1 = P ′ ) without restoration.
The without restoration property requires that no pair of alternatives is swapped more than once along a sequence of adjacent orderings. Now, consider the following richness condition on the domain, which also appeared in the definition of top connectedness.
Definition 8 A domain D is rich if for every a ∈ A, there exists P ∈ D such that r(P, a) = 1.
Richness and connectedness without restoration are sufficient for top connectedness. Since many domains are known to satisfy connectedness without restoration, and richness is easy to verify, this gives us an easy method to check top connectedness.
Lemma 1 If D is rich and connected without restoration, then it is top connected.
Proof : Choose any a ∈ A. By richness, there is a P ∈ D such that r(P, a) = 1. Now, choose any P ′ ∈ D. Since D is connected without restoration, there is a sequence of preferences (P ′ = P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P k , P k+1 = P ) without restoration such that for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, P j ∈ D. Since r(P, a) = 1 and the sequence of preferences is without restoration, we have r(P j , a) ≥ r(P j+1 , a) for all j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}. Hence, D is top connected.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 is that the single peaked domain (with respect to a given strict linear order) is top connected.
Proposition 1 The single peaked domain is top connected.
Proof : Sato (2013b) shows that the single peaked domain is connected without restoration. Clearly, it is a rich domain. Hence, Lemma 1 proves the claim.
This shows that Theorem 1 applies to the important single peaked type space. Next, we show that a particular type of single crossing domain is top connected.
Definition 9 A set of preferences D is a single crossing domain if there exists a strict linear order ≻ on the set of alternatives and a strict linear order ⊳ on the set of preferences D such that for all a, b ∈ A and for all P, P ′ ∈ D,
• a ≻ b, P ⊳ P ′ , and aP b implies aP ′ b
• a ≻ b, P ⊳ P ′ , and bP ′ a implies bP a.
Single crossing domains are a well studied domain in voting and political economy (Saporiti, 2009) . They can also be a plausible domain restrictions in models with transfers. For instance, Suppose A is the set of products in the market and ≻ reflects the ranking of products in terms of reputation. Now, set of preferences of a consumer for the products can be ordered by observing how sensitive he is to reputation of the products. This is captured by the ordering ⊳.
For any ordering P over A and any ordering ≻ over A, let X(P, ≻) := {(a, b) : a ≻ b, aP b}. Clearly, a set of preferences D is a single crossing domain if and only if there exists a strict linear order ≻ on the set of alternatives and a strict linear order ⊳ on the set of preferences D such that for any P, P ′ ∈ D with P ⊳ P ′ , we have X(P, ≻) X(P ′ , ≻) (notice the strict inclusion). We will denote a single crossing domain as D ≻,⊳ .
A single crossing domain D ≻,⊳ := {P 1 , . . . , P l } with P 1 ⊳ . . . ⊳ P l is a successive single crossing domain if for every j ∈ {1, . . . , l − 1}, |X(P j , ≻)| + 1 = |X(P j+1 , ≻)|. Successive single crossing domains were introduced in Carroll (2012).
Proposition 2 A rich successive single crossing domain is top connected.
Proof : We will show that a rich successive single crossing domain is connected without restoration, and by Lemma 1, we will be done. Let D ≻,⊳ := {P 1 , . . . , P l } be a rich successive single crossing domain with P 1 ⊳ P 2 ⊳ . . . ⊳ P l . Pick P j , P k ∈ D ≻,⊳ with j < k. The sequence of preferences (P j , P j+1 , . . . , P k ) satisfies the fact that for any j ′ ∈ {j, j + 1, . . . , k − 1}, P j ′ and P j ′ +1 are adjacent -this follows from the definition of successive single crossing domain. Now, assume for contradiction, there is some pair of alternatives x, y ∈ A such that they are swapped more than once in this sequence. But the single crossing property requires that if x ≻ y, once xP k ′ y for some P k ′ in the sequence, it must remain xP l ′ y for all l ′ > k ′ . Hence, getting swapped more than once will violate the single crossing property. This means that every successive single crossing domain is connected without restoration.
This shows that Theorem 1 applies to a rich successive single crossing type space. Every successive single crossing domain need not be rich. The domain in Example 2 is a successive single crossing domain but it is not rich. However, there is a rich successive single crossing domain. We identify this constructively. Below, we describe an algorithm to construct one rich successive single crossing domain.
For our construction, we assume that the underlying ordering over A to be ≻. Let P 1 be the preference ordering which is the reverse ordering of ≻. We now describe how we construct a sequence of orderings that constitute our domain. The construction is inductive. Suppose we have found a preference ordering P j . Then, we adopt the following procedure to construct P j+1 or stop. We say that a pair of alternatives a, b ∈ A are inconsistent between P j and ≻ if a ≻ b and bP j a. If a and b are not inconsistent between P j and ≻, then they are consistent between P j and ≻.
• If P j is the same ordering as ≻, we stop. Our domain is {P 1 , . . . , P j }.
• If P j is different from ≻, then we define A(P j , ≻) := {{a, b} : |r(P j , a)−r(P j , b)| = 1 and a, b are inconsistent between P j and ≻}.
• Choose {x, y} ∈ A(P j , ≻) such that for every {a, b} ∈ A(P j , ≻), we have min(r(P j , x), r(P j , y)) ≤ min(r(P j , a), r(P j , b)).
Let P j+1 be the ordering obtained as by swapping x and y and maintaining the positions of other alternatives as in P j , i.e., r(P j+1 , x) = r(P j , y), r(P j+1 , y) = r(P j , x) and r(P j+1 , z) = r(P j , z) for all z ∈ A \ {x, y}. The procedure is then repeated.
Since P 1 is initialized, this sequence of ordering is well defined. Moreover, the sequence will terminate since there will come a stage with preference ordering P j where A(P j , ≻) will be empty, and thus, P j will be the same ordering as ≻. Let (P 1 , . . . , P l ) be the sequence of ordering constructed by this algorithm. We define ⊳ as the relation P 1 ⊳ P 1 ⊳ . . . ⊳ P l . We show the following.
Claim 4 The domain D ≻,⊳ := {P 1 , . . . , P l } is a rich successive single crossing domain.
The proof is in the Appendix. P 1 P 2 P 3 P 4 P 5 P 6 P 7 P 8 P 9 P 10 P 11 We give an example in Table 3 of a rich successive single crossing domain constructed from our procedure. This domain is single crossing with respect to the ordering ≻ over alternatives where a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d ≻ e and the preferences are ordered according to ⊳ as P 1 ⊳ P 2 ⊳ P 3 ⊳ P 4 ⊳ P 5 ⊳ P 6 ⊳ P 7 ⊳ P 8 ⊳ P 9 ⊳ P 10 ⊳ P 11 .
The rich successive single crossing domain produced by our algorithm has n(n−1) 2 + 1 preference orderings as compared to 2 n−1 preference orderings in the single peaked domain. 5
Remark. We end this section with a remark on local incentive compatibility in voting environments. The type of an agent in a voting environment is a preference ordering. The standard notion of local incentive compatibility, introduced in Sato (2013b), in those models is the ordinal notion of adjacent incentive compatibility we introduced earlier: a mechanism is adjacent incentive compatible if an agent of type P cannot manipulate to any type P ′ , where P ′ and P are adjacent.
A plausible conjecture seems to be that if a domain D is such that every ordinal adjacent compatible mechanism is incentive compatible, then Theorem 1 holds in the type space cl (V (D) ). This conjecture is false. Carroll (2012) shows that in every successive single crossing domain, an ordinal adjacent compatible mechanism is incentive compatible. However, Example 2 shows a successive single crossing domain that is not rich, and Theorem 1 breaks down.
Discussions on Non-Ordinal Type Spaces
We now discuss the implication of payment-only incentive compatibility in general type spaces. In particular, we ask if there are type spaces that are not ordinal and non-convex where Theorem 1 holds.
Consider an example with A = {a, b, c} and a type space where type of an agent assigns a non-negative value to one of the alternatives and assigns zero to all the other alternatives. Hence, the type space T is defined as follows:
Notice that T consists of the non-negative parts of three axes in R 3 . We will denote these three parts of T as T a , T b , T c and note that T = T a ∪ T b ∪ T c and intersection of any two of them contains only the origin.
Suppose (f, p) is a locally incentive compatible mechanism. For every x ∈ A, convexity of T x implies (by Carroll (2012)) (f, p) restricted to each T x is incentive compatible. But this alone is not sufficient to guarantee incentive compatibility. Consider the following mechanism in Table 4 . It is easy to verify that this mechanism is locally incentive compatible -one easy way to see this is that the mechanism is incentive compatible on T a , T b , T c and it is incentive compatible on a small neighborhood around the origin. However, it is not incentive compatible since a type t with t(b) > 0.5 gets a utility of t(b) − 0.5 from truthtelling but can manipulate to a type s with s(a) ∈ [0.25, 0.5] to get a utility of t(b). This manipulation is possible since the mechanism is not payment-only incentive compatible -if s(a) ∈ [0.25, 0.5] we have f (s) = b and p(s) = 0 but when t(b) > 0.5 we have f (t) = b and p(t) = 0.5. Payment-only incentive compatibility alone cannot get rid of this problem. To see this, consider the modification of this mechanism in Table 5 . Again, it is straightforward to verify that the mechanism in Table 5 is locally incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible. However, an agent with type t, where t(b) > 0 and t(a) = t(c) = 0, can still manipulate to a type s, where s(a) ∈ [0.25, 0.5], s(b) = s(c) = 0. We now formally define this type space.
Definition 10 A type spaceT ⊆ R |A| is a unique dichotomous type space if
Every type in a unique dichotomous type space has a unique alternative for which it gets non-negative value and gets zero value on other alternatives. We need the following range condition on the allocation rules.
Definition 11 An allocation rule f :T → A satisfies strict range condition (SRC) if for every a ∈ A, there exists t ∈T with t(a) ≥ 0, t(b) = 0 for all b = a such that f (t) = a.
Theorem 1 extends to the unique dichotomous type space using SRC.
Theorem 2 Suppose f :T → A is an allocation rule satisfying SRC. Let (f, p) be a mechanism defined overT . Then, the mechanism (f, p) is locally incentive compatible and paymentonly incentive compatible if and only if it is incentive compatible.
Proof : Let (f, p) be a locally incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible mechanism, where f satisfies SRC. As before, for any x ∈ A, let T x denote all the types inT such that t(x) ≥ 0, t(y) = 0 for all y = x. Consider a type t such that f (t) = a and t ∈ T b . Local incentive compatibility along with convexity of T b implies that (f, p) restricted to T b is incentive compatible (Carroll, 2012) . Payment-only incentive compatibility allows us to write p as a map p : A → R. Choose any c = a. For incentive compatibility of (f, p), we need to show that t(a) − p(a) ≥ t(c) − p(c). If c = b, SRC implies that there is a type in T b where f chooses b. Since (f, p) restricted to T b is incentive compatible, we get the desired inequality. Else, c / ∈ {a, b}. Then, t ∈ T b implies that t(c) = 0. Now, the origin 0 ∈ T x for all x ∈ A. Let f (0) = z. Since (f, p) restricted to each T x is incentive compatible, we can write
Adding these two inequalities, we get t(a) − p(a) ≥ t(z) − p(c) ≥ t(c) − p(c), where the last inequality followed from the fact t(z) ≥ 0 = t(c).
The result in Theorem 2 seems difficult to extend to other connected type spaces. For instance, consider an example with three alternatives A = {a, b, c}. We say a type t ∈ R 3 + is dichotomous if there exists a non-negative number α ≥ 0 and a subset of alternatives S ⊆ A such that t(a) = α for all a ∈ S and t(a) = 0 for all a / ∈ S. Let T d be the set of all dichotomous types. The dichotomous type space is a generalization of the unique dichotomous type space. They were studied in Mishra and Roy (2013) , who characterized the implementable rules in this type space.
The dichotomous type space T d consists of rays from the origin. Local incentive compatibility only ensures that along each ray incentive compatibility holds and around the origin incentive compatibility holds. This is not sufficient to guarantee overall incentive compatibility even with payment-only incentive compatibility and range conditions. To see this, consider the example in Table 6 . The mechanism (f, p) given in the example in Table 6 is locally incentive compatible -it can be easily verified from the fact that it is incentive compatible along each of the rays and incentive compatible around a neighborhood of the origin. It is also payment-only incentive compatible. However, it is not incentive compatible. For instance, consider a type t with t(a) = t(b) = 0.55, t(c) = 0. From Table 6 , we see that f (t) = c and p(t) = 0, and hence, truthtelling generates a utility of zero. However, by reporting a type s with s(b) = 0.55, s(a) = s(c) = 0, we have f (s) = b, p(s) = 0.5, which generates a utility of 0.05 for the agent with type t. Hence, agent with type t manipulates to s.
No reasonable range condition can fix these kind of problems in this type space. Essentially, every ray corresponds to a subset of alternatives whose value is non-negative. Incentive compatibility along the rays only ensures that there is a cutoff value below which the agents gets an alternative outside this subset of alternative (giving zero value) and above which he gets an alternative inside this subset of alternative (giving positive value). But this is not enough for incentive compatibility in this type space. Mishra and Roy (2013) show that incentive compatibility also implies that the cutoffs along these rays have to be carefully chosen and the alternatives below and above these cutoffs have to be chosen in a particular manner.
Type space 
Local Implementation
We now look at mechanism design by verifying local incentive constraints using the implementation perspective. In quasilinear environment, instead of analyzing a mechanism (f, p), we can only consider implementability of the allocation rule f .
Definition 12 An allocation rule f is implementable if there exists a payment rule p such that (f, p) is incentive compatible.
Because of well know revenue equivalence results, for every implementable allocation rule, the payment rule can be identified up to an additive constant in connected type spaces (Chung and Olszewski, 2007) . Hence, instead of asking when a locally incentive compatible mechanism is incentive compatible, we can ask when a locally implementable allocation rule is implementable. If we identify a type space where an appropriate notion of local implementability implies implementability, verifying whether a mechanism is incentive compatible or not boils down to verifying local implementability of the allocation rule and then using revenue equivalence results. We now formally define the notion of local implementation. Definition 12 has an existential qualifier. We can remove this by using the well known characterization of implementability due to Rochet (1987) . First, for any allocation rule f , we define ℓ f (s, t) := t(f (t))−t(f (s)) for every pair of types s, t in the type space.
Definition 13 An allocation rule f is cyclically monotone if for every finite sequence of types (t 1 , . . . , t k ), we have k j=1 ℓ f (t j , t j+1 ) ≥ 0, where (k + 1) ≡ 1.
Fact 2 An allocation rule is implementable if and only if it is cyclically monotone.
Fact 2 is true in every type space (Rockafellar, 1970; Rochet, 1987) .
Definition 14 An allocation rule f is strongly locally implementable if for every t ∈ T , there exists an ǫ > 0 such that f restricted to B ǫ (t) is implementable.
Equivalently, f is strongly locally implementable if for every t ∈ T , there exists an ǫ > 0 such that f restricted to B ǫ (t) is cyclically monotone.
This notion of strong local implementation was introduced in Archer and Kleinberg (2008) . However, it is not the counterpart of local incentive compatibility since local incentive compatibility requires that for every t in the type space, there is an ǫ > 0 such that for every s ∈ B ǫ (t), incentive constraints between s and t must hold -it is silent about incentive constraints among other types in B ǫ (t). Local incentive compatibility can be generalized in the context of implementation using a weaker form of cycle monotonicity.
Definition 15 An allocation rule f is locally implementable if for every t ∈ T , there exists an ǫ > 0 such that for all s ∈ B ǫ (t), we have
This notion of local implementation is also discussed in Archer and Kleinberg (2008) , who called it weak local implementation and showed that this may not imply implementability in convex type spaces if the allocation rule is a randomized allocation rule. However, if the allocation rule is deterministic, a locally implementable allocation rule is implementable in a convex type space (Archer and Kleinberg, 2008) .
Hence, in convex type spaces with deterministic allocation rules, (a) a locally implementable allocation rule is implementable (Archer and Kleinberg, 2008) and (b) a locally incentive compatible mechanism is incentive compatible (Carroll, 2012) . Our objective here is to show that local implementation implying implementation is a stronger result than local incentive compatibility implying incentive compatibility in a large class of domains. Further, we use this result to search for more non-convex type spaces where local incentive compatibility implies incentive compatibility.
Definition 16 A type space T is a locally implementable (LIM) type space if every locally implementable allocation rule f : T → A is implementable.
A type space T is a locally incentive compatible (LIC) type space if every locally incentive compatible mechanism (f, p) defined on T is incentive compatible.
We identify sufficient conditions on type spaces where every LIM type space is a LIC type space. We do this for the following type spaces.
Definition 17 A k-tuple of points (s 1 , . . . , s k ) will be called a polygonal connection from s to t in T if s 1 = s, s k = t and for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, the line segment
The type space T is polygonally connected if for every pair of points s, t ∈ T , there is a polygonal connection from s to t.
Every open connected set is polygonally connected. This leads to the main result of this section.
Theorem 3 Suppose type space T ⊆ R |A| is polygonally connected. If T is an LIM type space, then it is an LIC type space.
Proof : Consider a mechanism M ≡ (f, p) in a polygonally connected type space T , which is locally incentive compatible. Choose a type t ∈ T , ǫ > 0, and s ∈ B ǫ (t). By local incentive compatibility,
Adding these incentive constraints, gives us
This shows that f is locally implementable. Since T is a LIM domain, f is implementable. This implies that there exists a payment rule q : T → R such that (f, q) is incentive compatible. Now, choose any pair of points s, t ∈ T . By polygonal connectedness, there exists a sequence of points (s = s 1 , . . . , s k = t) in T such that for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, the line segment joining s j and s j+1 lie in T . Now, consider any j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and the line segment L j joining s j and s j+1 . Now, (f, p) restricted to L j is also locally incentive compatible in L j . Since L j is convex, by Carroll (2012) , (f, p) restricted to L j is incentive compatible. Also, (f, q) restricted to L j is incentive compatible. Now, we apply revenue equivalence. 
Since L j is convex, revenue equivalence holds (Rockafellar, 1970) . 6 As a result, we have p(s j+1 ) − p(s j ) = q(s j+1 ) − q(s j ).
Summing the above equations for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, and telescoping, we get p(s k ) − p(s 1 ) = q(s k ) − q(s 1 ).
Using s = s 1 and t = s k , we get p(t) − p(s) = q(t) − q(s). Thus, we have shown that for any pair of types s, t ∈ T , p(t) − p(s) = q(t) − q(s) ≤ t(f (t)) − t(f (s)), where the last inequality came from incentive compatibility of (f, q). But this implies that (f, p) is also incentive compatible.
Remark. Theorem 3 also holds (with identical proof) if we allow for randomization. Further, it also holds if we strengthen the notion of local incentive compatibility and local implementability in the lines of Definition 14.
Remark. We stress that Theorem 3 does not imply that the result in Archer and Kleinberg (2008) implies the result in Carroll (2012) for deterministic mechanisms. This is because the proof in Theorem 3 uses the fact that a locally incentive compatible mechanism on a line segment is incentive compatible on that line segment. This fact was shown in Carroll (2012).
Applying Theorem 3
We now apply Theorem 3 to some specific type spaces. An immediate corollary of Theorem 3 is that there are top connected type spaces that are not LIM type space.
Corollary 1 The single peaked type space cl(V (D s )), where D s is the single peaked domain, is not an LIM type space.
Proof : If the single peaked type space is an LIM type space, by Theorem 3, it is an LIC type space. By Claim 1, Example 1 contains a locally incentive compatible mechanism that is not incentive compatible. This is a contradiction.
One wonders if imposing the range condition STR helps. Theorem 3 can be restated with the STR condition, i.e., if every locally implementable allocation rule satisfying STR is implementable in a type space, then every locally incentive compatible mechanism (f, p) with f satisfying STR is incentive compatible in that type space. The same proof of Theorem 3 goes through. Since the allocation rule in Example 1 satisfies STR, we again conclude that in the single peaked type space there are locally implementable allocation rules satisfying STR that are not implementable.
We conclude by using Theorem 3 to identify a new non-convex type space that is LIC.
The punctured type space is a generalization of an example given in Archer and Kleinberg (2008) , in which the type space is R 2 minus the origin. Archer and Kleinberg (2008) show that their type space is a LIM type space. We strengthen their result by (a) generalizing their type space and showing it is LIM and (b) showing it to be an LIC type space by applying Theorem 3.
Theorem 4 Every punctured convex type space is a LIM and LIC type space.
Proof : Let T be a punctured convex type space such that T =T \ K, whereT ⊆ R |A| is an open convex set and K ⊆ R |A| is a finite set. We say an allocation rule f is 2-cycle monotone if for every s, t ∈ T , ℓ f (s, t) + ℓ f (t, s) ≥ 0. Since the closure of T is convex, by Ashlagi et al. (2010) , 2-cycle monotonicity is equivalent to implementability in T . Let f : T → A be a locally implementable allocation rule. We show that is 2-cycle monotone. Choose any s, t ∈ T . If the line segment joining s and t lie in T , then by Archer and Kleinberg (2008) Note that s ′ can be chosen arbitrarily close to s since K is finite. A similar argument shows that there exists a type t ′ arbitrarily close to t such that f (t) = b. Further, since K is finite, s ′ and t ′ can be chosen such that the line segment joining s ′ and t ′ does not intersect with K, and hence, lies in T . By Archer and Kleinberg (2008) , f along this line segment is 2-cycle monotone. Hence, s ′ (a) − s ′ (b) ≥ t ′ (a) − t ′ (b). Since s ′ is arbitrarily close to s and t ′ is arbitrarily close to t, we get s(a) − s(b) ≥ t(a) − t(b).
This shows that a punctured convex type space is a LIM type space. Since a punctured convex type space is open and connected, it is also polygonally connected. By Theorem 3, it is then a LIC type space.
Conclusion
A necessary condition for a type space to be LIM or LIC is that it has to be connected subset of R |A| . It seems difficult to come up with type spaces that are connected but non-convex which is LIM or LIC. Indeed, the result in Carroll (2012) says that if a type space is not an LIC type space, then it must be fairly separated, where he also used randomized mechanisms. A fairly separated type space is non-convex, but this result does not rule out if there are non-convex type spaces which are LIC or LIM. Several examples in Archer and Kleinberg (2014) seem to suggest that one cannot hope to get interesting type spaces beyond convex type spaces.
In a specific, but important class of non-convex type spaces, we show that if we restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms, then local incentive compatibility along with payment-only incentive compatibility implies incentive compatibility. We also show a relationship between local implementation and local incentive compatibility. A natural future question is to characterize or provide necessary conditions on type spaces where local implementability implies implementability.
We show that D ≻,⊳ is rich. Pick any alternative a ∈ A. We will show that there exists some P j ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P k } such that r(P j , a) = 1. Let r(P 1 , a) = ℓ. We show this using induction on ℓ. If ℓ = 1, then we are done. Suppose ℓ > 1 and the claim is true for all k ′ < ℓ. Note that the claim is true if ℓ = |A| -this is because the terminating preference ordering P k of the algorithm is ≻. Hence, ℓ < |A|.
Let b be an alternative such that r(P 1 , b) = ℓ − 1. By the induction hypothesis, there is a preference ordering P h ∈ {P 1 , . . . , P k } such that r(P h , b) = 1. Without loss of generality, let P h be such that for all h ′ > h, we have r(P h ′ , b) = 1. We argue that r(P h , a) = 2.
Assume for contradiction that r(P h , a) = 2. Then, r(P h , a) > 2. Let r(P h , c) = 2, where c = a. Since r(P h+1 , b) = 1 and P h and P h+1 are adjacent, it must be that r(P h+1 , c) = 1 and r(P h+1 , b) = 2. Since c and b are not consistent between P h and ≻, it must be that bP 1 c. This implies that bP 1 aP 1 c (since a and b are consecutively ranked in P 1 ). But note that c and a are consistent between P h and ≻. By the definition of our procedure, there must exist h ′′ < h such that a and b are consistent between P h ′′ and ≻ -this follows from the fact that higher ranked inconsistent pairs are made consistent earlier in our procedure. By the single crossing property, a and b must be consistent between P h and ≻. This is a contradiction since a ≻ b and r(P h , b) = 1.
Hence, r(P h , a) = 2. Since P h and P h+1 are adjacent and r(P h+1 , b) = 1, it must be that r(P h+1 , a) = 1. This shows that D ≻,⊳ is rich.
